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THE MODERN THREAT:  DATA BREACHES, SECURITY 
MEASURES, AND A CALL FOR CHANGES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Data breaches are a major threat to the public at large, and no 
individual or industry is safe from them.1  In 2018, there were 1,244 data 
breaches, ranging in areas from banking to education and government.2  
Due to  those breaches, a whopping 446 million records were stolen from 
individuals, including financial information and Social Security number.3  
Of the 1,244 data breaches, 135 (10.9%) fall into the banking/credit/fi-
nancial category.4  Consumers are rightfully concerned about the privacy 
of their data and its ability to be compromised in the event of a major 
breach.5  Individuals view the compromise of their information as an in-
fringement, and they are aware that the risk of losing personal infor-
mation to malicious parties is much greater now than it ever has been due 
to the high frequency of data breaches in today’s world.6 
This Note focuses on recent high-profile data breaches and the 
questions that arise in their wake.  This Note proceeds in seven parts.  Part 
II outlines recent major data breaches that have occurred.7  Part III uses 
field research to analyze and pinpoint how consumer trust is affected in a 
negative way when customers are confronted with a data breach.8  Part 
 
 1. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT (Jan. 7, 
2019), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-
Aftermath_FINALWEB-V2-1.pdf (illustrating that data breaches have affected a large 
amount of people and virtually every industry). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. (defining this sector to include “entities such as banks, credit unions, credit 
card companies, mortgage and loan brokers, financial services, investment firms and trust 
companies, payday lenders and pension funds.”). 
 5. See FICO Survey: US Consumers Fear Bank Fraud and ID Theft More Than Terror-
ist Attack, PR NEWSWIRE (July 27, 2017, 8:30 ET), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-re-
leases/fico-survey-us-consumers-fear-bank-fraud-and-id-theft-more-than-terrorist-attack-
300492706.html (“44 percent of US consumers rate identity theft and banking fraud as their 
top concern.”). 
 6. See id. (“The loss of your personal information or money from your account cuts 
deep, it is a violation, and people now know it’s much more likely to happen to them.”). 
 7. See infra Part II (discussing recent data breaches). 
 8. See infra Part III (analyzing consumer trust after a breach). 
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IV identifies the common security measures used by banks and looks at 
new developments in cybersecurity.9  Part V focuses on consumers’ neg-
ative reactions when faced with additional security measures and the 
banking industry’s acknowledgement that increased security measures 
negatively affect their customers’ experiences.10  Part VI lays out a blue-
print for the future of data security, including a recommendation for fed-
eral cybersecurity regulation for the financial industry, as well as a call to 
require all regulators to include the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool 
(“CAT”) as part of their examinations.11  Lastly, Part VII concludes that 
these options would likely lessen the frequency of breaches.12  
II.  HISTORY OF DATA BREACHES 
In December 2014, Sony Pictures “admitted to having suffered a 
major cybersecurity breach.”13  Hackers managed to steal and release in-
dividuals’ private information and sensitive documents, which they then 
released to the public.14  In the days before Thanksgiving 2014, Sony em-
ployees who attempted to access their computers were met with an unfa-
miliar image.15  Over the following weeks multiple statements, allegedly 
from the Guardians of Peace (“GOP”), were posted online.16  The state-
ments were followed by links to download a large amount of information 
 
 9. See infra Part IV (detailing security measures commonly used). 
 10. See infra Part V (focusing on how consumers and banks feel about additional security 
measures). 
 11. See infra Part VI (discussing a call for change). 
 12. See infra Part VII (concluding that meaningful change could help to prevent these 
breaches from occurring with such great frequency). 
 13. Joseph Steinberg, Massive Security Breach at Sony-Here’s What You Need to Know, 
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014, 1:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/josephstein-
berg/2014/12/11/massive-security-breach-at-sony-heres-what-you-need-to-
know/#3d0b9c9344d8. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-
hack-explained/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b658d53f0f59 (“Sony Pictures employees who 
tried to log into their computers were greeted with a graphic of a neon red skeleton featuring 
the words ‘#Hacked by #GOP,’ and a threat to release data later that night if an unspecified 
request was not met.”). 
 16. See id. (detailing that of the information posted online, many were “to a text-sharing 
site called PasteBin, which is also used by some hacktivist groups.”); see also Hacktivist, 
OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hacktivist (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2019) (defining hacktivist as “A person who gains unauthorized access to computer 
files or networks in order to further social or political ends.”). 
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belonging to Sony.17  In a memo shortly after the first leak, Sony Pictures 
executives acknowledged the major theft of confidential data in a state-
ment, and acknowledged that personal information could be in the 
hacker’s hands.18 
The banking sector was not spared, as it fell victim to a cyberat-
tack as well.19  In October 2014, JPMorgan “revealed that seventy-six 
million households and seven million small businesses may have had 
their private data compromised in a cyberattack.”20  In an SEC filing, 
JPMorgan stated that their users’ personal contact information, as well as 
their account information, had been taken.21  After charging the individ-
uals responsible for the attack, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York called it “the single-largest theft of data from a U.S. finan-
cial institution.”22 
This problem has continued to rear its ugly head recently.23  T-
Mobile suffered a breach that affected two million customers, during 
which their personal and account information was compromised.24  While 
T-Mobile was quick to alert customers that their Social Security numbers 
and financial information were not compromised, customers were cau-
tioned to be on guard going forward.25  A breach of this type has the 
 
 17. See Peterson, supra note 15 (discussing that there were “huge amounts of what ap-
peared to be data from Sony Pictures’ internal networks.”). 
 18. See Peterson, supra note 15 (“While we are not yet sure of the full scope of infor-
mation that the attackers have or might release, we unfortunately have to ask you to assume 
that information about you in the possession of the company might be in their possession.”). 
 19. Sam Ro, JPMorgan Reveals Gigantic Data Breach Possibly Affecting 76 Million 
Households, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2014, 4:58 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jp-
morgan-data-breach-2014-10. 
 20. Id.  
 21. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (October 2, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312514362173/d799478d8k.htm; 
see also id. (detailing that the extent of the breach was “user contact information—name, 
address, phone number and email address—and internal JPMorgan Chase information relat-
ing to such users have been compromised.”). 
 22. See Portia Crowe, JPMorgan Fell Victim to the Largest Theft of Customer Data From 
a Financial Institution in US History, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2015, 10:12 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgan-hacked-bank-breach-2015-11 (detailing that the 
total number of customers affected was 83 million, according to Preet Bharara). 
 23. Jerry Beilinson, Two Million T-Mobile Customers Are Hit by A Data Breach, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (August 24, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/2-million-
t-mobile-customers-hit-by-data-breach/. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. (stating that other threats can exist even in the absence of stolen financial 
information). 
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potential to increase vulnerability for customers.26  While customers be-
come most alarmed when their Social Security Number or credit card in-
formation is compromised, other stolen information can be just as detri-
mental to privacy.27  For example, if a hacker obtains account 
information, they can send an email that looks identical to one a customer 
would receive from T-Mobile, containing accurate account and billing 
information; these are attempts to steal the customer’s password, which 
would give the hacker full access to the online account.28 
The aforementioned breaches only represent a small subset of the 
high-profile data breaches that have occurred.29  Banks and financial in-
stitutions face an average of eighty-five breach attempts per year.30  The 
average cost of a breach is around four million dollars, yet, in an industry 
that is as highly regulated as financial services is, the costs extend far 
beyond that of the average price due to consumers switching financial 
institutions.31 
III.  CONSUMER TRUST IN THE WAKE OF A BREACH 
While overall data demonstrates that consumers are likely to dis-
continue the relationship with their bank after a breach, there was a 
slightly different result when responses were focused solely on millenni-
als.32  A Gallup poll revealed that an overwhelming majority of millenni-
als are extremely trusting when it comes to companies protecting their 
 
 26. See id. (“In a phishing attack, criminals could send a consumer a counterfeit email—
with a real account number and billing information—claiming to be from T-Mobile and ask-
ing him or her to follow a link and log in.  Such an email could be an attempt to trick the 
consumer into revealing a password.”). 
 27. See id. (“Companies are quick to reassure consumers if no Social Security numbers 
or credit card numbers were stolen, but other data losses can create just as much havoc,” says 
Robert Richter, who leads privacy and security testing at Consumer Reports.). 
 28. See id. (“In a phishing attack, criminals could send a consumer a counterfeit email—
with a real account number and billing information—claiming to be from T-Mobile and ask-
ing him or her to follow a link and log in. Such an email could be an attempt to trick the 
consumer into revealing a password.”). 
 29. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 1 (discussing the high number of breaches 
that have taken place). 
 30. Rocco Grillo, Regulatory Compliance Does Not Equal Cybersecurity, CLEARING 
HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2017/2017-q2-banking-per-
spectives/articles/regulatory-compliance-does-not-equal-cybersecurity (last visited January 
17, 2019). 
 31. Id.  
 32. John H. Fleming & Amy Adkins, Data Security: Not a Big Concern for Millennials, 
GALLUP (June 9, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/192401/data-security-not-
big-concern-millennials.aspx. 
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information.33  The poll results showed that millennials are much more 
trusting of their respective financial institutions than non-millennials 
(67% for millennials as compared to 56% of non-millennials).34  The re-
port concluded that millennials may even be naïve when it comes to the 
security of their online information.35 
IV.  DATA SECURITY MEASURES 
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(“FFIEC”) was founded in 1979, pursuant to “the Financial Institutions 
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978.”36  The FFIEC is an 
organization tasked with creating “uniform principles, standards, and re-
port forms for the federal examination of financial institutions.”37  An 
important FFIEC development relating to cybersecurity was CAT, which 
was unveiled in 2017.38  The purpose of CAT is to assist organizations 
with identifying risks and determining the maturity of their cybersecurity 
measures.39  CAT is structured as a two-step process: first, management 
of the organization determines its “risk profile” based on five categories: 
(1) Technologies and Connection Types; (2) Delivery Channels; (3) 
Online/Mobile Products and Technology Services; (4) Organizational 
Characteristics; and (5) External Threats.40  The next step for manage-
ment is to calculate their “Cybersecurity Maturity” according to five do-
mains: (1) Cyber Risk Management and Oversight; (2) Threat Intelli-
gence and Collaboration; (3) Cybersecurity Controls; (4) External 
Dependency Management; and (5) Cyber Incident Management and 
 
 33. See id. (“[The study] found that an impressive 80% of [millennials] say they have 
‘some’ or ‘a lot’ of trust in the companies they do business with to keep their personal infor-
mation secure.”). 
 34. See id. (“Millennials exhibit the greatest amount of trust in their primary bank, with 
67% of this group saying they have a lot of trust in this institution, compared with 56% of 
non-millennials.”). 
 35. See id. (“[M]illennials seem to rise above [data breaches], remaining trusting—and 
perhaps idealistic—in the face of an abundance of evidence that their online data might not 
be very secure.”). 
 36. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, ABOUT THE FFIEC (last 
modified August 29, 2018, 1:11 PM), https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm.  
 37. Id. 
 38. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY 
ASSESSMENT TOOL at 1 (May 2017), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecu-
rity/FFIEC_CAT_May_2017.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
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Resilience.41  CAT is useful because  it allows management to evaluate 
their organization’s maturity levels  in comparison to their risk.42  Ma-
turity levels rank from baseline, which constitutes the minimum expecta-
tions, to innovative, which entails creating new controls or tools.43 
CAT was designed for institutions to assess their preparedness for 
breach events.44  The FFIEC gives institutions a process capable of repe-
tition in order to ensure they are ready in the case of an attack on their 
data and information.45  While use of CAT is not required, it provides a 
step-by-step process that is of value to financial institutions.46  
One common security measure used by banks and financial insti-
tutions is two-step authentication.47  Two-step authentication is structured 
as follows: first, a consumer signs in with their credentials.48  After entry 
of their credentials, the consumer must enter another piece of infor-
mation, which usually takes the form of a code sent to a linked mobile 
phone.49  The common belief of institutions is that by having this addi-
tional layer of security, hackers will be unable to access a consumer’s 
information solely on the basis of having the consumer’s password.50  
This common belief, however, may be a colossal misconception.51 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2 (detailing that it allows management to “determine whether its maturity levels 
are appropriate in relation to its risk. If not, the institution may take action either to reduce the 
level of risk or to increase the levels of maturity.”). 
 43. See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY 
ASSESSMENT TOOL at 7 (May 2017), https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/cybersecu-
rity/FFIEC_CAT_May_2017.pdf. (stating that the maturity levels are: Baseline, Evolving, 
Intermediate, Advanced, and Innovative). 
 44. Id. at 2. 
 45. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFIEC RELEASE UPDATE 
TO CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr053117.htm (“[The FFIEC] developed the Assessment to help 
financial institution management determine the institution’s risk profile, inherent risks and 
cybersecurity preparedness. The Assessment provides a repeatable and measurable process 
that financial institution management may use to measure cybersecurity preparedness over 
time.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Two-Factor Authentication Helps Protect the One and Only You, WELLS FARGO, 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/privacy-security/fraud/articles/two-factor-authentication/ (last 
visited February 8, 2019) (discussing how Wells Fargo uses two-factor authentication). 
 48. See id. (detailing how two-step authentication is carried out). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. See Laurene Hummer, What’s Wrong with SMS Authentication? Two IBM Experts 
Weigh In on the NIST Recommendation, SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (September 7, 2016), 
https://securityintelligence.com/whats-wrong-with-sms-authentication-two-ibm-experts-
weigh-in-on-the-nist-recommendation/ (discussing the short-comings of two-step authentica-
tion when it comes to text messages). 
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In May 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) recommended the phasing-out of text message authentication 
as the second step in two-step authentication.52  Two-step authentication 
falls short of absolute security due to the possibility of a consumer un-
knowingly downloading malware onto their phone.53  Thus, hackers can 
authorize their malware to keep track of consumer text messages.54  Even 
in the absence of malware, hackers can intercept and spy on text mes-
sages.55  
A new development with a slight twist on the traditional model 
of two-step authentication is the advent of Duo Mobile.56  Duo Mobile is 
an app for mobile devices or tablets that uses two-step authentication, but 
does so by the approval of push notifications rather than online insertion 
of a code texted to a mobile phone.57  Users can thus thwart unauthorized 
attempts to access their information by simply denying the unexpected 
push notification that appears.58 
The Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council has created 
the new “Financial Services Sector Cybersecurity Profile” as an exten-
sion of the NIST framework already in existence.59  The profile is very 
flexible and adaptable, and can be used on the smallest community bank 
 
 52. Id.; see also NAT’L INST. STANDARDS AND TECH., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-
63-3, DIGITAL IDENTITY GUIDELINES (June 2017) (detailing why text message authentication 
is problematic). 
 53. See Hummer, supra note 51; Malware, NORTON BY SYMANTEC, https://us.nor-
ton.com/internetsecurity-malware.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2019) (“Malware is an abbrevi-
ated form of ‘malicious software.’ This is software that is specifically designed to gain access 
to or damage a computer, usually without the knowledge of the owner.”).  
 54. See Hummer, supra note 51 (“[A] fraudster can simply command the malware to 
monitor text messages.”). 
 55. Hummer, supra note 51.   
 56. See Secure Two-Factor Authentication App, DUO, https://duo.com/product/trusted-
users/two-factor-authentication/duo-mobile (last visited Jan. 29, 2019) (“Logging in securely 
is fast and easy with Duo Push, the more secure method of two-factor authentication supported 
by Duo Mobile.”).  
 57. See id. (“Users quickly verify their identity by approving push notifications before 
accessing applications.”). 
 58. See id. (“[Someone] can easily stop fraudulent attempts to access company data by 
tapping the deny button.”). 
 59. See Lydia Beyoud, Financial Industry Unveils Streamlined Cyber Compliance Stand-
ard, BLOOMBERG LAW (October 25, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bank-
ing-law/financial-industry-unveils-streamlined-cyber-compliance-standard-1 (“The ‘finan-
cial services sector cybersecurity profile’ is intended as an extension of an existing 
cybersecurity framework established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST).”). 
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or the largest bank in the world.60  In using this new profile, financial 
institutions can expect to reduce their compliance responsibilities be-
tween forty-nine and seventy-three percent.61 
Wells Fargo, the third largest bank in the United States, lays out 
on their website precisely how they identify their customers and protect 
their data.62  One of the notable features Wells Fargo employs is the use 
of a one-time password in order to establish identity if there is a high-risk 
transaction taking place.63  An example of a high-risk transaction is send-
ing money to an individual for the first time, or being transferred funds 
from a non-Wells account for the first time.64  Moreover, in addition to 
the use of two-step authentication, Wells Fargo goes above and beyond 
with the use of biometric authentication.65  Biometric authentication re-
quires customers to use their fingerprints or facial features to sign into 
their mobile banking app.66  When it comes to data protection, Wells 
Fargo has minimum encryption and browser requirements, as well as an 
ongoing monitoring scheme.67  The browser requirement is designed to 
block older browsers that are not as secure, while the monitoring scheme 
will require further proof of authentication if a customer’s banking trans-
actions and behaviors sway from their usual pattern.68 
In an interesting turn of events, banks and financial institutions 
are working together to assess their respective levels of preparedness for 
simultaneous cyberattacks.69  In October 2018, JPMorgan Chase, 
 
 60. See id. (“The profile can be scaled to match a financial institution’s size and needs, 
from community banks to the largest multinational financial institutions.”). 
 61. Id.  
 62. Amanda Dixon, America’s Fifteen Largest Banks, BANKRATE (February 21, 2018), 
https://www.bankrate.com/banking/americas-top-10-biggest-banks/#slide=1; see How We 
Protect You, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/privacy-security/fraud/protecting-
you (last visited February 8, 2019) (detailing their consumer protection devices). 
 63. See How We Protect You, supra note 62 (indicating that Advanced Access is triggered 
when a high-risk transaction is involved); Advanced Access Questions, WELLS FARGO, 
https://www.wellsfargo.com/help/online-banking/advanced-access-faqs/  (last visited Febru-
ary 8, 2019) (defining Advanced Access as “a free service that gives you an additional layer 
of security to better protect your information and help prevent unauthorized transactions.”). 
 64. See Advanced Access Questions, supra note 63 (requiring use of Advanced Access 
for “[sending] money to another person that you haven’t transferred money to before, or re-
ceive money from a non-Wells Fargo account that you haven’t used before.”). 
 65. How We Protect You, supra note 62. 
 66. How We Protect You, supra note 62. 
 67. How We Protect You, supra note 62. 
 68. See How We Protect You, supra note 62 (“[O]utdated browsers could lead to a secu-
rity risk.”). 
 69. See Yalman Onaran, Global Payment Firms Hold First Cyber War Game, 
BLOOMBERG (October 12, 2018, 10:13 AM), 
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Mastercard, American Express, and others participated in exercises that 
unveiled crucial information about their varying approaches to defining 
what constitutes a “crisis.”70  The results of this exercise will be used to 
create a more streamlined system between these participating institutions, 
including an effort to efficiently communicate information about various 
threats.71 
V.  CONSUMER AND BANK REACTION TO SECURITY MEASURES 
Banks and financial institutions are cognizant of how the security 
measures they enact impact customer satisfaction.72  A survey conducted 
by Information Security Media Group discovered that 53% of financial 
institutions believe their customers view some of their security controls 
as inconvenient.73  Moreover, 54% of institutions believe that they do a 
fair job balancing the priorities of responding to threats against cyberse-
curity and keeping the customer experience pleasant.74  While banks ap-
pear to be moderately pleased with their ability to balance safety and con-
sumer satisfaction, they are confident in their ability to defend a 
cyberthreat.75  A study found that 78% of institutions have faith in their 
cybersecurity strategy as a whole.76 
 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-09/global-payment-firms-hold-first-
cyber-war-game-to-test-readiness (“Global payment companies held their first joint cyberse-
curity war games to test their systems’ readiness for simultaneous attacks, uncovering differ-
ences in their defenses including even how to define a crisis.”). 
 70. See id. (“The participants discovered that they had varying definitions of a crisis re-
lated to breaches as well as differing approaches in how they reach out to law enforcement.”).  
 71. See id. (“The sector will also seek a more formal way of sharing information on 
threats.”). 
 72. See INFO. SEC. MEDIA GRP., PRESERVING THE CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE (2016) (stating 
that 63% of respondents say, when it comes to cybersecurity, that preserving a seamless cus-
tomer experience is a top priority). 
 73. See id. (“[The survey] generated more than 150 responses from financial institutions 
primarily in the U.S., Canada, EMEA, Asia, and Australia. Respondent organizations all had 
1,000 or more employees, and 30 percent manage assets of $20 billion or more.”).  
 74. See id. (stating that they “say their organizations currently maintain a fair balance 
between cybersecurity and maintaining the online customer experience.”). 
 75. Steve Evans, Banks Confident About Cybersecurity, but Gaps Remain, INFOSECURITY 
GROUP (March 9, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/banks-confident-
about-cybersecurity/. 
 76. See id.; James Murphy, Accenture Report: Banks Confident in Cybersecurity Capa-
bilities But Lack of Real-World Testing Leaves Gaps in Their Defense, ACCENTURE (April 19, 
2017), https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/accenture-report-banks-confident-in-cyberse-
curity-capabilities-but-lack-of-real-world-testing-leaves-gaps-in-their-defense.htm (conduct-
ing the survey by polling “275 senior security executives across the banking and capital mar-
kets sectors”). 
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When it comes to the customer experience, millions of Americans 
think security measures for phone and internet security are unduly bur-
densome.77  A Fair, Isaac, and Company (“FICO”) survey found that 81% 
of Americans find security measures “unnecessary”.78  Customers are un-
doubtedly relieved that their financial institution cares about protecting 
their information, but nonetheless are frustrated by how complicated the 
measures are when it comes to simply using their account.79  Striking a 
delicate balance between security and customer experience will be key 
for institutions going forward.80 
VI.  THE FUTURE OF SECURITY AND A CALL FOR REGULATION 
A. Regulatory Attempts and Failures 
A development that has the potential for long-lasting impact is 
the presence of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) 
Committee on Bank Supervision (“CBS”).81  In its Fiscal Year 2018 Op-
erating Plan, CBS listed cybersecurity among its highest priority objec-
tives for the year.82  CBS called for an analysis of banks’ and financial 
institutions’ abilities to withstand  cyberattacks.83  A particularly 
 
 77. Scott Zoldi et al., Survey: Americans are Frustrated by Security Measures, FICO 
BLOG (July 9, 2018), http://www.fico.com/en/blogs/fraud-security/survey-americans-are-
frustrated-by-security-processes/. 
 78. See id. (detailing that the survey was conducted by FICO and 72 Point, and polled 
2,000 adults). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. (quoting TJ Horan, who oversees fraud solutions at FICO: “When it comes to 
digital transformation, a smooth customer experience is going to be vital. The winners will be 
the firms that can balance this against the need to stop fraud.”). 
 81. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC FISCAL YEAR 2018 BANK 
SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN, https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-re-
leases/2017/nr-occ-2017-113a.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) [hereinafter OCC FISCAL YEAR 
2018 BANK SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN]; Press Release by Bryan Hubbard, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Releases Bank Supervision Operating Plan for Fiscal Year 
2018 (September 28, 2017), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-re-
leases/2017/nr-occ-2017-113.html. 
 82. OCC FISCAL YEAR 2018 BANK SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN, supra note 81, at 1. 
 83. See id. at 6 (calling for “assessing specific cybersecurity controls as part of infor-
mation security, including key areas of cybersecurity risk management, such as the service 
providers’ risk management, control structures, and level of cyber resilience. Examiners 
should assess banks’ service providers’ risk management structures for managing cybersecu-
rity; assessing service providers’ level of cyber resilience and completing the Federal Finan-
cial Institutions Examination Council’s Technology Service Provider Cybersecurity Assess-
ment Tool as part of the examination process.”). 
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interesting portion of CBS’ objective is their use of the FFIEC’s CAT.84  
This illustrates how highly regarded CAT is for assessing an institution’s 
cybersecurity protocol.85   
For depository institutions, three of the main regulators are the 
OCC, the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), and the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (“FDIC”).86  The FRB is the federal regulator of 
state member banks, and the FDIC is the federal regulator for state non-
member banks.87  Moreover, the OCC is the chief regulator of national 
banks as well as federal savings associations.88  Due to the important 
function they serve, one would reasonably believe that the OCC has strict, 
specific regulations that the banks they oversee must follow when it 
comes to protection of customers’ data; however, this is not the case.89  
That is not to say that the OCC has been negligent or has turned a blind 
eye to this important issue.90  In October 2016, the OCC, FRB, and FDIC 
promulgated a proposed regulation in regards to increased cybersecurity 
standards for organizations they supervised, which included all banks, 
savings associations, and savings banks.91  
This proposed regulation would have only affected systemati-
cally important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).92  The proposed rule 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 4. 
 86. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE 
ACTIVITIES 135 (5th ed. 2017). 
 87. Id.  
 88. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC REGULATIONS, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/laws-regulations/occ-regulations/index-occ-regula-
tions.html (last visited January 17, 2019) [hereinafter OCC REGULATIONS]. 
 89. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FINAL ISSUANCES, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/laws-regulations/occ-regulations/final-issuances/index-fi-
nal-issuances.html. (last visited January 17, 2019) [hereinafter FINAL ISSUANCES] (detailing 
how the OCC has promulgated numerous rules over the years, without any relating to cyber-
security). 
 90. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AGENCIES ISSUE ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED 
RULEMAKING ON ENHANCED CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS (October 19, 2016), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16092.html. 
 91. Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards: A Proposed Rule by the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the Fed. Reserve System, and the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp’n, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8172 (proposed October 26, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.pt. 364).  
 92. Shaun Waterman, Business Lobby Pushes Back on Cyber Rule for Banks, 
CYBERSCOOP (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.cyberscoop.com/us-chamber-fdic-occ-federal-re-
serve-bank-cyber-rule/; see also Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards: A Proposed 
Rule by the Comptroller of the Currency, the Fed. Reserve System, and the Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp’n, 82 Fed. Reg. 8172 (proposed October 26, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.pt. 364) 
(referring to those with more than $50 billion in assets, labeled systemically important by the 
Dodd-Frank financial reforms.). 
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narrowed their focus to SIFIs in that these are the institutions capable of 
having a large impact on the financial system in the event that a cyber-
attack were to cripple one of these institutions.93  The regulators allowed 
for an extended comment period in order to allow interested individuals 
an opportunity to let their voices be heard on this important and compli-
cated topic.94  However, a final rule was never promulgated once the com-
ment period closed.95  A common comment expressed concern about add-
ing more regulation, instead proposing the centralization of existing 
regulations and the plugging of gaps in the regulatory framework in-
stead.96  Another concern focused on how an additional regulation would 
create an inflexible structure.97  
The main reason a final rule never came to fruition can be traced 
to remarks made by the United States Chamber of Commerce.98  In a let-
ter sent to the OCC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and 
the FDIC, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce expressed concern that strict 
requirements on banks and financial institutions would be unduly specific 
and would simply be a formulaic list of requirements.99  The focal point 
of the Chamber of Commerce’s letter was the formulaic list concern.100  
The letter concluded by stating, “[c]ybersecurity is not a one-size-fits-all 
proposition.”101  The Chamber of Commerce felt that organizations 
 
 93. Id.  
 94. Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8172.  
 95. See FINAL ISSUANCES, supra note 89 (listing the final rules promulgated by the OCC, 
and not including “Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards.”). 
 96. See THE CLEARING HOUSE ASS’N, COMMENT LETTER ON PROPOSED ENHANCED CYBER 
RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 3 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.theclearinghouse.org//me-
dia/tch/documents/tchweekly/2017/20170217_comment_letter_enhanced_cyber_risk_man-
agement_standards.pdf (“The Clearing House accordingly recommends that, prior to proceed-
ing with new requirements, the agencies should focus on consolidating existing standards, 
and work with industry stakeholders to assess the gaps that exist in the current regulatory 
framework….”). 
 97. See id. (“Addressing the mechanism through prescriptive standards embeds inflexi-
bility and a lack of responsiveness to new risks, which weakens institution-specific and sec-
toral risk management capabilities, and works at counter-purpose to our shared goals.”). 
 98. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMENT LETTER ON PROPOSED ENHANCED CYBER 
RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 6 (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/files/us_chamber_enhanced_standards_comment_letter_011817.pdf. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 98 at 6. 
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should be allowed to create a cybersecurity program based on their indi-
vidual needs.102 
 State regulators are supplementing the efforts of federal regula-
tors to fill the gaps they see in the regulatory structure.103  The New York 
State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) unveiled its cybersecu-
rity requirements for financial services companies in March 2017.104  The 
DFS believed that new requirements were needed after finding that data 
breaches cost New York businesses upwards of $1.3 billion.105  The DFS 
called for financial institutions to put measures in place, such as imple-
menting a cybersecurity program and designating a Chief Information 
Security Officer106 to protect customer information, and gave examples 
of acceptable security measures.107  This scheme would have co-existed 
alongside the proposed rule that was never adopted, due to the fact that 
the NY scheme does not limit its scope specifically to SIFIs.108  
B. Two Potential Courses of Action 
Why should the onus be placed upon the banking and finance sec-
tor when breaches occur in virtually every industry?109  Simply put, hu-
mans value money over most anything, and are likely to make changes 
 
 102. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 98 at 6 (“[C]ompanies must develop 
cybersecurity programs that are tailored to the risks that they face and their unique operational 
requirements.”). 
 103. See NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANIES (2017), https://blog.vasco.com/download/2416/ (codifying 
New York’s cybersecurity regulations). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN’S OFFICE, INFO. EXPOSED (July 14, 
2014), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/data_breach_report071414.pdf (stating that the exact cost has 
been $1.37 billion). 
 106. See Waterman, supra note 92 (laying out the regulatory requirements). 
 107. See Michael Magrath, Top Banking Regulations & Security Compliance Require-
ments for 2018, ONESPAN, (August 29, 2018), https://blog.vasco.com/legal/top-banking-reg-
ulations-security-compliance-requirements-2018 (“Through a risk assessment, financial insti-
tutions must implement effective controls to prevent unauthorized access to information 
systems or non-public information. These controls may include multi-factor authentication, 
biometric authentication, or risk-based authentication.”). 
 108. See NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 103 (stating that “Covered 
Entity” is defined as “any Person operating under or required to operate under a license, reg-
istration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the Banking 
Law, the Insurance Law or the Financial Services Law.”). 
 109. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 1, at 9 (detailing that breaches occurred in 
sectors including banking, business, education, government, and medical). 
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when their money may be compromised.110  Therefore, since money is 
kept in the hands of banks and financial institutions, the pressure is 
ramped up on these entities.111  Moreover, banks are of the utmost im-
portance to our financial system as they take deposits from customers and 
then lend that money out to borrowers and attach an interest rate.112  
When banks fail, there is a massive ripple effect, best evidenced by the 
2008 Financial Crisis in which twenty-five banks failed and closed, al-
most immediately, with many more following suit.113 
The issue of cybersecurity for banks and financial institutions has 
become large enough that functional regulation should be considered as 
a viable option.  Functional regulation is designed to make sure the “most 
qualified and knowledgeable people” are overseeing a particular field, 
such as banks or financial institutions.114  The advantages of functional 
regulation include fairness and expertise.115  The fairness advantage 
comes from the fact that all entities would be subject to the same cyber-
security regulations.116  
 
 110. See Suzanne Lucas, Americans Value Money Over Time Off, CBS MONEYWATCH 
(Feb. 28, 2014, 8:23 AM) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-value-money-over-
time-off/ (“Given a choice between an extra week of vacation or 5 percent increase in salary, 
79 percent of Americans will take the raise, according to a recent survey by finance recruit-
ment firm Accounting Principals.”); see also Rahul Telang & Sriram Somanchi, Security, 
Fraudulent Transactions, and Customer Loyalty: A Field Study, CARNEGIE MELLON 
UNIVERSITY (Nov. 12, 2016, 12 AM), https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2016/ISSecurity/Presenta-
tions/10/ (“[The study] focused on more than 500,000 customers of a leading U.S. bank over 
a five-year period and found that customers who experienced unauthorized charges on their 
account were one percentage point more likely than the average customer to end the relation-
ship with their bank within the next six months.”). 
 111. See Caroline Fairchild, More Money Always Leads to More Happiness: Study, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/29/money-and-
happiness-study_n_3179345.html (detailing that advances in income are always met with in-
creases in life satisfaction). 
 112. See The Business of Banking, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 28, 1999), https://www.econo-
mist.com/unknown/1999/10/28/the-business-of-banking (“[Banks] are vital to economic ac-
tivity, because they reallocate money, or credit, from savers, who have a temporary surplus 
of it, to borrowers, who can make better use of it.”). 
 113. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BANK FAILURES IN BRIEF (Jan. 5, 2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2008/index.html (briefly discussing the 25 banks 
across the United States that failed in 2008). 
 114. Will Kenton, Functional Regulation, INVESTOPEDIA, (May 21, 2018), https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/f/functional-regulation.asp. 
 115. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 86, at 282. 
 116. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 86, at 282 (“It is only fair that the same func-
tions are regulated the same way, no matter what type of financial entity is performing the 
function.”). 
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However, there are potential downsides to functional regula-
tion.117  Since this type of regulatory scheme divides regulatory authority 
based on type of product or service, there can be potential conflicts when 
innovation occurs and blends two defined services.118  One example de-
picts how this blending can be problematic: derivatives created a disa-
greement between the CFTC and SEC over which entity had regulatory 
authority.119 
In a functional regulatory scheme, a federal cybersecurity body 
should be created with the power and authority to enact uniform standards 
and regulations for the banking and financial industry.  Creating a regu-
lator that solely focuses on cybersecurity in the banking and finance in-
dustries would allow the regulator to become the “most qualified and 
knowledgeable” regulator due to having a singular focus.120  The other 
major regulators in banking, e.g. the OCC, the FRB, and the FDIC, are 
responsible for regulating practically everything a bank does.121  If these 
agencies attempt to regulate cybersecurity, in addition to the various com-
plex issues they already oversee, this important issue likely will not re-
ceive the attention it deserves.122  
 
 117. See Patricia A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 12.02 21 (2d ed. 2018) (discussing 
the several downsides of functional regulation). 
 118. See id. (“[B]ecause the functional approach divides regulatory authority according to 
established product lines, the regulatory apparatus has difficulty resolving jurisdictional quar-
rels over product innovations, particularly for new products that are hybrids of the old.”). 
 119. See id. (“The SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission dueled over 
who has jurisdiction over derivatives.”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act §§ 712, 717, 718, 722 12 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012) (2010)) (laying out the 
extent to which the SEC and CFTC each have authority over derivatives).  
 120. See Kenton, supra note 114 (stating that functional regulations will make sure that 
the “most qualified and knowledgeable people” are supervising a financial institution’s activ-
ities). 
 121. See OCC REGULATIONS, supra note 88 (detailing the various regulations promulgated 
by the OCC as an example). 
 122. See generally Cesar Cerrudo, Why Cybersecurity Should Be The Biggest Concern of 
2017, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcoun-
cil/2017/01/17/why-cybersecurity-should-be-the-biggest-concern-of-2017/#698fb1135218 
(discussing the vital importance of cybersecurity). 
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The problem with the current regulatory scheme is twofold.123  
First, there are many entities that are attempting to regulate.124  This has 
led to regulations that conflict without one holding more weight than oth-
ers.125  Secondly, there is a tension between federal and state regulation 
of cybersecurity.126  In addition to the aforementioned attempts by the 
NYCDFS and the OCC, regulations and rules have poured in from the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the National 
Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”), and the Financial Industry Reg-
ulatory Authority (“FINRA”).127  However, these regulators are only a 
subset of a much larger, murkier regulatory picture.128  Other major reg-
ulators in play include the FRB and the FDIC.129  An example is helpful 
to illustrate the illogical nature of this system:  The Federal Trade Com-
mission (“FTC”) is not required to structure its penalties with the “best 
practices” put forward by the NIST.130  
Moreover, the regulatory landscape is diluted due to the co-oper-
ative nature of state and federal cybersecurity laws.131  By allowing a ma-
jority of states to implement data breach notification requirements-and a 
smaller subset of states attempting to get companies to follow guidelines 
to protect data-there is an abundance of regulation for companies and or-
ganizations that conduct business across the country.132  This creates a 
culture of inefficiency for companies that operate in multiple states, as 
they must sort through potentially conflicting requirements.  In practice, 
cybersecurity and cyber-attacks are a national, and in most cases, global 
 
 123. See Karen A. Popp & Edward R. McNicholas, Regulatory Focus on Information Se-
curity Incidents, BUS. & COMMERCIAL LITIG. IN FED. COURTS at 2 (Robert L. Haig, ed., 4th ed. 
2017) (detailing the numerous parties that have promulgated cybersecurity regulations); see 
also Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985 (2018) (discussing the 
problems with current cybersecurity regulations). 
 124. See Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123 (detailing the numerous parties that have 
promulgated cybersecurity regulations). 
 125. See Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123 (discussing how the various parties that 
have issued cybersecurity regulations have led to conflicting law). 
 126. See Kosseff, supra note 123 (discussing the problems with current cybersecurity reg-
ulations). 
 127. Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123.  
 128. Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123. 
 129. Federal Banking Regulators, COMPLIANCE ALLIANCE, https://www.compliancealli-
ance.com/laws-regulations/bank-regulators (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).  
 130. Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029. 
 131. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (discussing the problems with current cyberse-
curity regulations). 
 132. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (“[I]t is difficult to align a set of effective cy-
bersecurity incentives that apply to companies with national operations.”). 
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threat.133  It is not  practical for states to exercise the control they currently 
do, as this is an area that calls for strong leadership from the federal gov-
ernment.134  New York wanted to create a culture of regulatory compli-
ance when they passed new regulations in 2017, and this federal regula-
tory body is poised to accomplish the same goal in a more uniform, 
centralized manner.135 
Creating a new regulatory body would eliminate the need for all 
of the existing regulations that have been promulgated across different 
regulatory bodies.136  The biggest potential benefit of having a new regu-
lator would be the possibility of an increase in consumer confidence 
about the protection of their data.  Consumers would see that the federal 
government is taking cybersecurity issues seriously, rather than letting 
numerous agencies create rules and guidance on the issue. 
An important practical point when it comes to this idea is the cur-
rent political climate in the U.S.137  The idea of fewer regulations fits 
within the Trump Administration’s theme of deregulation.138  In May 
2018, President Trump signed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, 
and Consumer Protection Act, putting into place the “biggest rollback of 
financial regulation since the Dodd-Frank Act.”139  Creating a new fed-
eral regulatory body falls in line with President Trump’s mission in that 
doing so would allow the existing rules and regulations to be removed 
and then replaced by one institution.140  The cumulative effect of rolling 
back the existing regulations and replacing them with new regulations 
promulgated by a federal body should-ideally-result in a net decrease in 
 
 133. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (discussing how cybersecurity threats are “in-
herently interstate (and global)” in nature). 
 134. See Kosseff, supra note 123, at 1029 (discussing whether it is “practical—for states 
to continue to exercise such control over the future of U.S. cybersecurity law.”). 
 135. See Sabrina Galli, Note, NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulations: A Blueprint for Uniform 
State Statute?, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 235, 236 (2018) (“NYDFS’ new regulations place a 
tremendous amount of responsibility on financial institutions and shift the business strategy 
from a mindset of risk mitigation to one of regulatory compliance.”). 
 136. See Popp & McNicholas, supra note 123 (discussing the various bodies that have 
promulgated regulations on the issue of cybersecurity). 
 137. See Terry Jones, Deregulation Nation: President Trump Cuts Regulations at Record 
Rate, INVESTORS (August 14, 2018), https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/dereg-
ulation-nation-president-trump-cuts-regulations-at-record-rate/ (discussing a policy goal of 
the Trump Administration). 
 138. See id. (arguing that de-regulation is a focal point of the Trump Administration). 
 139. Elizabeth Dexheimer, Trump Signs Biggest RollBack of Bank Rules Since Dodd-
Frank Act, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2018-05-24/trump-signs-biggest-rollback-of-bank-rules-since-dodd-frank-act. 
 140. Jones, supra note 137.  
176 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
number of regulations.141  Under this scheme, state regulations should be 
preempted by the federal regulations, as the state regulations that were 
designed to “plug gaps” will no longer be necessary.  
A legitimate concern about this proposed course of action centers 
around how a new regulator would be funded.  The most logical funding 
scheme would involve an examination fee being charged to each financial 
institution.  With the average cost of a breach hovering around $4 million, 
notwithstanding additional costs such as loss of business, financial insti-
tutions should see the benefit of spending a small sum in the short-run in 
order to save a large amount of money in the long-run.142  
In the event that it is deemed too burdensome to create a new 
federal agency, or that regulation will not be able to keep up with novel 
scammer tactics, all regulators of the financial industry should be re-
quired to examine institutions based on CAT results.  This possibility will 
also shift the approach from punishing institutions that do not meet regu-
latory requirements to a system that focuses on helping banks avoid 
cyber-attacks.143  One issue that makes this difficult is that some regula-
tors have determined that use of CAT is not required.144  For example, the 
FDIC, OCC, and FRB all have stated that use of CAT is optional.145  
While all institutions are encouraged to use CAT to assess their 
own maturity levels-and in fact many institutions have completed CAT 
assessments-it is natural that some smaller institutions may not have the 
 
 141. Jones, supra note 137. 
 142. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“The average dollar cost of a breach is reported to be $4 
million, yet regulated industries, such as health care and financial services, pay a higher price 
because of fines and the higher-than-average rate of lost business and customers.”). 
 143. See FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL, 
https://www.ffiec.gov/cyberassessmenttool.htm (last visited February 8, 2019) (explaining 
that CAT will “help institutions identify their risks and determine their cybersecurity prepar-
edness” because “[t]he Assessment provides a repeatable and measurable process for financial 
institutions to measure their cybersecurity preparedness over time.”). 
 144. Tom Hinkel, Cybersecurity and Compliance: What You Need to Know, BANK NEWS, 
https://www.banknews.com/blog/cybersecurity-and-compliance-what-you-need-to-know/ 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2019). 
 145. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL  (July 2, 2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2015/fil15028.html (“Use of the Cybersecurity 
Assessment Tool is voluntary.”); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
FFIEC CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL (June 30, 2015), https://www.occ.gov/news-issu-
ances/bulletins/2015/bulletin-2015-31.html (“While use of the Assessment is optional for fi-
nancial institutions, OCC examiners will use the Assessment to supplement exam work to 
gain a more complete understanding of an institution’s inherent risk, risk management prac-
tices, and controls related to cybersecurity.”). 
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infrastructure to conduct this voluntary review.146  This likely explains 
why these three regulators make CAT use optional, as they do not want 
to unduly burden smaller institutions.147  However, regulators still expect 
smaller institutions to have infrastructure in place to keep track of cyber 
threats and attacks.148  The difference is that rather than force these 
smaller institutions to use CAT, which is time-consuming,149 they are al-
lowed to seek out other alternatives, such as hiring an IT service pro-
vider.150 
CAT assessment completion is not the end of the road; a crucial 
following step is to conduct a “gap analysis.”151  This informs the institu-
tion of the measures necessary to bring the institution’s results into ac-
cordance with a desired level by either minimizing risk or enhancing ma-
turity.152  The desired level is contingent on the amount of risk the 
institution’s board of directors is willing to tolerate, and thus different for 
almost every institution.153  After a risk tolerance is established by the 
Board, the institution can establish whether the outstanding risks are 
within the amount of tolerance accepted by the board.154 
While requiring regulators to examine based on CAT results will 
be an important first step, the examination will be fruitless without ap-
propriate enforcement tools to use if CAT performance is deemed inade-
quate by the regulator.  For example, the OCC has a variety of enforce-
ment tools at its disposal, ranging from commitment letters and formal 
 
 146. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“[T]hreat intelligence and collaboration can be a chal-
lenge for smaller financial institutions that don’t have dedicated cybersecurity resources.”). 
 147. Hinkel, supra note 144.   
 148. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“Even though your community bank may lack the size 
and complexity of the larger national banks, regulators still expect all financial institutions to 
identify and monitor cyber threats, and to use that information to inform their own risk envi-
ronment as well as their specific controls.”).   
 149. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“The CAT assessment itself is 123 pages, with 69 ques-
tions and 10 categories.”). 
 150. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (stating that another option for cybersecurity, other than 
performing a CAT, is “utilizing a local IT service provider”). 
 151. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“Once your bank has completed both sections of the 
CAT, management should perform a gap analysis to determine the next steps.”). 
 152. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“The gap analysis should rank in importance the actions 
needed to reduce risks or increase control maturity in order to bring the actual state of opera-
tions in line with the desired state.”). 
 153. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (“The desired state should be based on an official risk 
appetite approved by the board.”). 
 154. See Hinkel, supra note 144 (stating how once banks settle on a risk tolerance, they 
can evaluate whether their current risks are at a level that fits into their risk tolerance). 
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agreements to civil money penalties.155  These tools will need to be used 
by the OCC to bring financial institutions into accordance with adequate 
standards.156  The FDIC states that they will communicate with the insti-
tution they are examining about CAT in order to ensure awareness of the 
tool, but this is not enough.157  Simply putting an institution on notice 
about CAT will not make a difference; the institutions that are not up to 
an appropriate standard based on the findings of CAT will need to be 
informed of their deficiency.  Moreover, the FDIC needs defined enforce-
ment tools in place specifically designed to handle issues regarding 
CAT.158   
By requiring that regulators examine institution’s using CAT re-
sults, financial institutions will be forced to come face-to-face with their 
cybersecurity issues.159  Most institutions have already acknowledged the 
major threat that a cyber-attack poses.160  For the institutions whose CAT 
results are problematic, the regulator will be able to better point out these 
deficiencies, ideally allowing the institution to rapidly fix their problems. 
At the end of the day, banks and financial institutions should 
make it a fundamental goal to reach a high level of cyber-resilience.161  
These institutions should shift the focus from a system of attempting to 
simply comply with applicable regulations to one of effective 
 
 155. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ENFORCEMENT ACTION 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUALS, (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issu-
ances/bulletins/2018/bulletin-2018-41.html (laying out the various informal and formal en-
forcement mechanisms at the OCC’s disposal). 
 156. See id. (setting forth the various informal and formal enforcement mechanisms at the 
OCC’s disposal). 
 157. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 145 (“FDIC examiners will discuss the Cy-
bersecurity Assessment Tool with institution management during examinations to ensure 
awareness and assist with answers to any questions.”). 
 158. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS AND ORDERS (Septem-
ber 4, 2018), https://www5.fdic.gov/EDO/index.html (explaining that the FDIC can initiate 
“enforcement actions…. for violations of laws, rules, or regulations, unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices, breaches of fiduciary duty, and violations of final orders, conditions imposed in 
writing or written agreements.”). 
 159. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 145 (“While use of 
the Assessment is optional for financial institutions, OCC examiners will use the Assessment 
to supplement exam work to gain a more complete understanding of an institution’s inherent 
risk, risk management practices, and controls related to cybersecurity.”). 
 160. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“Companies in North America view cybercrime and hack-
ing as their No. 1 risk.”). 
 161. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“Ultimately, cyberresilience—the ability to defend, re-
spond to, and recover from a breach—is the end goal for financial institutions, which tend to 
be facing thousands of attacks every day.”). 
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cybersecurity due diligence.162  Mandating the completion of CAT, com-
bined with regulators having appropriate enforcement tools if institu-
tions’ CAT results are found to be inadequate, is a central first-step to-
wards achieving cyberresilience.163 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Cybersecurity and protection of consumer data is a major issue 
facing the world today.164  Banks and financial institutions should be 
aware that consumers may sever ties with their respective bank after a 
data breach occurs.165  The call for uniform federal cybersecurity regula-
tion is one that could have long-lasting effects for the banking and finan-
cial industry.  One potential explanation for the high number of breaches 
that occur today is the lack of uniform standards employed by various 
institutions.166  If every institution were monitored and required to em-
ploy at least a minimum baseline of protection, hackers would not be able 
to take advantage of institutions with suboptimal security require-
ments.167  
Regardless of which method is used, it is clear that federal action 
is required on this issue.168  Consumers need to feel that their representa-
tives have the same degree of urgency about this issue as they do.  The 
OCC’s inclusion of cybersecurity among its main objectives for this fis-
cal year is a step in the right direction169, but in order for meaningful 
change to take place, consumers need a regulatory body with the ability 
to touch a wide variety of institutions to develop regulations and rules in 
a uniform manner.170  If swift action is not taken, the damage to sensitive 
information could be devastating. 
 
 162. See Grillo, supra note 30 (“The focus should be shifted toward conducting good cyber 
due diligence and assessments.”). 
 163. See Grillo, supra note 30 (discussing cyberresilience). 
 164. See supra Part I (discussing the data breaches that have occurred). 
 165. See supra Part III (detailing consumer reactions to data breaches).  
 166. See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 1 (discussing the high number of breaches 
that have taken place). 
 167. See James A. Lewis, Raising the Bar for Cybersecurity, CTR FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUDIES (Feb. 12, 2013), csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publica-
tion/130212_Lewis_RaisingBarCybersecurity.pdf (“96% of successful breaches could have 
been avoided if the victim had put in place simple or intermediate controls.”). 
 168. See supra Part VI (discussing two options for change). 
 169. OCC FISCAL YEAR 2018 BANK SUPERVISION OPERATING PLAN, supra note 81. 
 170. See supra Part VI (discussing the need for uniform federal cybersecurity regulation 
for the financial industry). 
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